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Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and by Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Peter Hansen, Stephen J. Turnovsky

By Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Peter Hansen, Stephen J. Turnovsky

Those 3 volumes include edited models of papers and commentaries awarded in invited symposium classes of the 8th global Congress of the Econometric Society. The papers summarize and interpret contemporary key advancements and destiny instructions in quite a lot of themes in economics and econometrics. They conceal conception and purposes and supply a different survey of growth within the self-discipline.

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Extra resources for Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume I (Econometric Society Monographs)

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In short, auction theory is central to economics. We pursue this agenda in the context of some of the main themes of auction theory: the revenue equivalence theorem, marginal revenues, and ascending vs. (first-price) sealed-bid auctions. To show how auction-theoretic tools can be applied elsewhere in economics, Section 2 exploits the revenue equivalence theorem to analyze a wide range of applications that are not, at first sight, auctions, including litigation systems, financial crashes, queues, and wars of attrition.

Queueing and Other “All-Pay” Applications The preceding applications have both been variants of “all-pay” auctions. , for tickets to a sporting event). ) will make no difference to the social cost of the queueing mechanism. 2) – can be modeled as all-pay auctions and may provide similar applications. 4. Solving for Equilibrium Behavior: Market Crashes and Trading “Frenzies” The examples thus far have all proceeded by computing the expected total payments made by all players. But, the RET also states that each individual’s expected payment must be equal across mechanisms satisfying the assumptions.

See Cramton and Schwartz (2001), and “Learning to Play the Game,” The Economist, May 17, 1997, p. 120. Klemperer (2002a) gives many more examples. The low prices in the ascending auction are supported by the threat that, if a bidder overbids a competitor anywhere, then the competitor will retaliate by overbidding the first bidder on markets where the first bidder has the high bids. At least since Stigler (1964). To the extent that the auctions for individual consumers are independent single-unit auctions, an ascending auction is efficient under a broad class of assumptions if bidders’ private signals are single-dimensional, even with asymmetries among bidders and common-value components to valuations.

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